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Abstract
We examine the contribution of economic and institutional transitions as two potential 
sources of subnational economic growth in Spain. To this end, we exploit the economic 
reforms of the 1959 Stabilization Plan (as an example of technocratic, economy-oriented 
reform) and the democratic transition in 1979 in Spain as the sources of variation for a 
sample of 50 Spanish provinces in the period 1950-2016. Our approach is to examine the 
impacts by estimating the missing counterfactual scenarios using the synthetic control 
method. Our results unveil a positive effect for both economic and institutional transitions 
on subnational economic growth. A direct comparison of both transitions suggests that the 
effect of economic liberalization is four-fold higher than the effect of political liberalization. 
The average growth effect of the economic liberalization is around 40% higher relative to the 
counterfactual scenario and it appears to be permanent. The estimated effects are robust 
to the variety of placebo tests and additional robustness checks. This article also deepens 
the analysis of the effects of the 1959 plan and finds that the policies that generated the 
most positive impact were those of an “internal” nature, compared to the external ones, 
dependent on access to the IMF (also positive, but of lesser impact).
JEL classification: economic growth, political economy, Spain.
Keywords: C23, D73, N24, O43. 
Resumen
Este artículo investiga qué tipo de cambios institucionales tienen un mayor impacto 
en el crecimiento económico de largo plazo: las reformas de carácter tecnocrático 
orientadas a la economía o la democratización. Con este objetivo, para el caso de 
España, examinamos el Plan de Estabilización de 1959 y la Transición a la democracia 
(en torno a 1979) como fuentes de variación para las 50 provincias españolas en el 
período 1950-2016. Nuestro enfoque consiste en estudiar los impactos mediante la 
estimación de los escenarios contrafactuales utilizando el método de control sintético. 
Nuestros resultados muestran que las dos estrategias tienen un impacto positivo sobre 
el crecimiento económico subnacional. Una comparación directa entre ambas apunta 
a que el efecto del Plan de Estabilización pudo ser cuatro veces mayor que el de la 
Transición. El efecto medio del Plan sobre el crecimiento es aproximadamente un 40 % 
mayor que en el escenario contrafactual y parece ser permanente. Los efectos estimados 
se mantienen frente a diferentes pruebas de placebo y otros contrastes adicionales de 
robustez. En cuanto al análisis de las medidas específicas del Plan de 1959, parece que 
las políticas de carácter interno generaron un impacto más positivo y de mayor alcance 
que las externas, dependientes del acceso al FMI. 
Palabras clave: desarrollo económico, economía política, España.
Códigos JEL: C23, D73, N24, O43.






The notion that democracy matters for economic growth has gained widespread scholarly attention 
(Helliwell 1994, Barro 1996, Minier 1998, Tavares and Wacziarg 2001, Plümper and Martin 2003, 
Gerring et. al. 2004, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008, Acemoglu et. al. 2019). The original idea 
behind democracy is the generalization of property rights (Locke 1689) that provides the set of 
institutions with a flat distribution of political power which allows citizens to express their political 
preferences only partially constrained by limited restrictions on the part of authorities. (Mukand and 
Rodrik 2020). The persistent rise in the number of liberal democracies and decline of autocracies 
commencing with the third wave of democratization in 1974 has increased interest in the effects of 
democracy on economic efficiency, specifically raising a simple question, namely, does democracy 
help or hurt economic growth? 
 
Some scholars argue that democracy is beneficial for economic growth in the long run. The positive 
effect of democracy has been widely acclaimed (Acemoglu et al. 2001, Roll and Talbott 2003, Rodrik 
and Wacziarg 2005, Persson and Tabellini 2006 and Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008). More recently, 
Acemoglu et. al. (2019) examine the contribution of democracy to economic growth in a large sample 
of countries using dynamic panel strategies controlling for unobserved country effects and rich 
dynamics of GDP. They show that democracy raises per capita income by around 20 percent, an effect 
that appears to be similar across different levels of development. The authors also argue that democracy 
helps economic growth through higher investment rate, improvement in access to health and education, 
higher rates of human capital investment and lower social unrest1. Democracies also invest more in 
broad-based public goods and implement economic reforms that would otherwise be resisted by 
politically powerful actors (Acemoglu 2008), so reducing both political and economic inequality and 
thus further fostering economic growth (Sirowy and Inkeles 1990, Saint-Paul and Verdier 1993, 
Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, Timmons 2008). 
 
However, not everyone agrees that democracy helps economic growth.2 Democratization may 
encourage socially inefficient redistribution of income and wealth to the non-elites (Acemoglu and 
                                                          
1 It is worth mentioning however that, in the literature on social security spending, there does not seem to be a 
general consensus on which political system is more favourable (Mulligan et al. 2010, Espuelas 2017) and, 
therefore, its impact on development would be ambiguous. However, for the Spanish case specifically, democracy 
seems to be related to higher social spending and its long-term trend (Espuelas 2017). 
2For instance, Barro (1996) argues that “more political rights do not have an effect on growth.” Furthermore, 
Gerring et. al. (2005) claim that “the net effect of democracy on growth performance cross-nationally over the 
last five decades is negative or null,” while Weede (1983) contends that “while a fairly strong and negative impact 
of democracy on growth can be demonstrated for nations where government revenue exceeds 20 percent of the 
GDP, elsewhere there is no effect at all. It is not democracy itself that hurts growth prospects of nations, but the 
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Robinson 2001), rapid expansion of civil liberties (Mukand and Rodrik 2020), greater demands for 
populist overspending and redistribution (Boix 2003, Knutsen and Wegmann 2016), higher tax rates 
alongside higher government spending (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001), and greater state interference in 
th  economy (Weede 1983), which may lead o more corruption (Aidt 2 09 In the particular case of 
Spain, democratization has also been related to an increase in the complexity and volume of regulation 
which could have had negative impacts on business demographics (Mora-Sanguinetti and Pérez-Valls 
2020). In a r c nt work, Di Vita (2018) docum nts a negative impact of egulatory complexi y on Italian
regional GDP per capita. Democratization can also breed rent-seeking coalitions among powerful 
interest groups that directly undermine growth and may lead to institutional sclerosis (Olson 1983). 
S e scholars also argue that democracy can also fos er distortionary and redistributive policies in 
agriculture, trade and labor markets which lead to subsidized losses, protectionism and costly labor 
market institutions (Henisz 2004, Yang 2011a, Fátas an Mihov 2013). Another strand of literature 
argues that democracy is a constraint on economic growth at low levels of development (Aghion et. al. 
2008, Posner 2010, Brooks 2013).3 According to this view, democratization might be unsustainable if 
it is introduced in the context of widespread poverty, low levels of education, and in the presence of a 
thin middle class, and may dampen rather than foster the modernization efforts (Lipset 1959, Hadenius 
and Teorel 2005, Evans and Rose 2007, Glaeser et. al. 2007). 
 
A critical light on the idea that democracy helps economic growth has been shed by Glaeser et. al. 
(2004). They argue that human capital is a more basic source of growth than political institutions (Barro 
1991, Mankiw et. al. 1992, Galor and Tsiddon 1997, Temple 1999, De la Fuente and Doménech 2006, 
Cohen and Soto 2007, Días and Tebaldi 2012, Lucas 2015, Murphy and O’Reilly 2019), and find that 
countries escape poverty traps through growth-friendly policies often pursued by dictators, rather than 
through democratic institutions.  
 
To bridge the gap in the literature, Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) examine the effects of political and 
economic liberalization on economic growth. Using difference-in-differences strategies that account for 
before vs. after-liberalization output per capita variation, they find that countries that liberalize their 
economies first, and subsequently become democracies have consistently better economic performance, 
more stable and better macroeconomic outcomes and more growth-friendly policies compared to the 
countries that democratize first and liberalize afterwards. 
 
In this paper, we examine the effect of economic and political liberalization strategies on economic 
growth by estimating their counterfactual scenarios using synthetic control techniques (Abadie et. al. 
                                                          
3 The general thrust of these arguments emphasizes that “dictatorship will often be optimal for very poor countries. 
Such countries tend not only to have simple economies but also lack the cultural and institutional preconditions 
to democracy.” (Posner 2010). 
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2010, 2015, Bill eie  an Nannicini 2013, Grier and Maynard 2016, Campos et. al. 2019, Absher et. al. 
2020). Whilst earlier tudies focus on cros -country c mparisons, we exa ine th  contribution of 
political and economic liberalization to econo ic growth at the subnational level. To this end, we
exploit two waves of liberalization in Sp in. More specificall , w  estimate th  growth effect of a large-
scale economic liberalization designed by a group of technocrats under the Franco regime in 1959 
known as the Macroeconomic Stabilization Plan (i.e. Plan de Estabilización), and the effect of the 
political liberalization in 1978 when Spain adopted the new democratic Constitution following Franco’s 
death. 
Employing a novel balanced matching strategy where we match Spanish provinces with other countries 
where these treatments are not perceivable, we are able to isolate the impact of political and economic 
liberalizations from other possible confounding channels.4 By estimating the missing counterfactual 
scenario, we compare Spanish provinces to countries that down to the present day have not yet 
implemented large-scale economic liberalization measures comparable with the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan, as well as to countries that did not undergo democratic transition in 1979, and remained either 
non-democracies or weak democracies down to the present day. This approach allows us to parse out 
the treatment effects of political and economic liberalization given that Spanish provinces are assessed 
against external sources of variation where these treatments somehow did not materialize. We find that 
both economic and political liberalization are associated with economic growth albeit to a different 
degree. More specifically, we find that economic liberalization in 1959 is associated with 44 percent 
higher province-level per capita GDP, which appears to be robust to a variety of placebo analyses, 
sample restrictions and specification checks. On the other hand, democratization in 1978 raised per 
capita GDP by about 10 percent relative to the plausible counterfactual scenario. This would imply that 
the macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization effect outperforms the growth effect of 
democratization by a wide margin, consistently with evidence from previous works (Giavazzi and 
Tabellini 2005, Bhattacharyya 2009, Jong-A-Pin and De Haan 2011, Yang 2011b, Flachaire et. al. 
2014). Our findings are also consistent with prior evidence found by Prados de la Escosura et. al. (2010) 
for Spain, who highlight significant reduction in macroeconomic distortions after the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan and show that by 1975, Spain’s per capita GDP without the Plan would have been between 15% 
and 33% lower. Our findings are also consistent with Monteforte (2020) counterfactual simulations 
showing large-scale productivity improvements calibrated to the data for post-war Spain and highlights 
the importance of labour reallocation premium in the structural transformation and TPF growth.  
 
                                                          
4 The study of how the institutional framework can generate divergences between Spanish provinces or even cities 
(beyond global changes for Spain as a whole) is common in the literature, with different approaches (see, for 
example, Rodriguez-Pose and Hardy 2021, Dejuán and Mora-Sanguinetti 2021). More generally, there is an 
extensive literature on the subject in economic geography (among many others, Gertler 2010). 
1
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We also contribute to the ongoing debate on unbundling the role of institutions initiated by Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005). They show that in the long run political institutions matter for economic growth 
while economic institutions do not because of time-inconsistent preferences. On the contrary, our 
evide ce shows that in a setup with GDP per capita heterogeneity where sev ral common sourc s f 
growth can be held fixed, economic institutions matter for economic growth, and have a permanent 
growth impact akin to the structural growth breakup (Garoupa and Spruk 2020) whilst political 
institutions have a considerably lower impact on economic growth that is consistent with the notion of 
a temporary impact which may become insignificant in the long run. 
 
Th  rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on the historical background. Section 
3 presents the identification strategy. Section 4 presents the data and samples. Section 5 discusses the 
results and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 Historical background 
 
In 1939, Spain became a political dictatorship after Francisco Franco’s forces defeated Republicans, 
marking the end of the civil war which started in 1936. After the end of the civil war, Franco’s 
dictatorship had at least three stages: firstly, a period of autarchy (1939-1950). Later, a period (1950-
1960) of reforms and gradual opening which culminated in the adoption of the 1959 Stabilisation Plan 
(i.e. Plan de Estabilización). Finally, another period began in which the Spanish economy was 
integrated into the international economic system (1960-1974) and enjoyed higher growth than in the 
previous stages (Harrison 1978, García-Delgado 1995). Franco died in 1975 and the process of 
transition and democratization began, culminating in the adoption of the 1978 Constitution. 
 
From an economic policy perspective, the period of autarchy (1939-1950) was characterized by the 
partially self-imposed exclusion of Spain from international forums. Spain embarked on a policy of 
developing import substitutes. In addition, Spain did not take advantage of the Marshall Plan, which 
did benefit other western European countries and was equally excluded from the United Nations. It 
should be recalled that the Marshall Plan, although known for its economic aid aspect, was the 
transmission belt of other reforms influenced by the US in European economies, such as changes in 
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Finances. In addition, legal reforms were promoted from the technical secretariat of the Ministry of the 
Presidency by Laureano López Rodó (appointed in 1956). A tenured professor of law, in 1962, he was 
appointed commissioner of the Development Plan. In fact, Bassols Coma (2010) relates both th  
economic and legal turnaround of the Franco regi e to this General Technical Secretariat.7 The period 
of influence of this group ends, in Harrison's opinion, in 1974, after the assassination of Prime Minister 
Carr o Blanco. Existing empirical evidenc  corroborates the notion of sustained tota  factor
productivity increases as a response to the 1959 Plan (Prados de la Escosura et. al. 2011). The overall 
transition from autarky to an institution l setup which llowed for free-market r ources allocation
fostered a rapid growth ath a d a conseque  catch-up with other European ec nomies and  significant
reduction in macroeconomic distortions.8  
 
With the death of Franco in 1975, Spain began the transition to democracy. In 1977 the first democratic 
elections since the time of the Second Republic took place. In December 1978, a referendum was held 
to adopt the new democratic Constitution, hich came into force on December 29. The new 
Constitution, similar to that of other European countries in terms of fundamental rights and obligations, 
established a decentralized territorial regime similar in many respects to that of a federal state (López 




3 Identification Strategy 
 
 3.1 The Setup 
 
Our aim is to estimate the effect of economic and political liberalization to subnational economic growth 
consistently. To this end, we estimate the missing counterfactual growth trajectories of Spanish 
provinces in response to the political and economic liberalization. By facilitating a comparison of 
growth trajectories with and without the institutional reforms (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013), the 
growth gap is indicative of the rough long-term growth impact of the liberalization (Abadie et. al. 2015, 
Abadie 2021). 
 
Our setup consists of 1J  units where 1,...2,1  Jj  spanning across the time period Tt ,...2,1 . In 
general terms, only the first “province” ( 1j ) is affected by the economic and political liberalization. 
                                                          
7 Other prominent members of the group were Jesús González Pérez and Manuel Ballbé Prunés. 
8 In parallel to these developments, it is worth noting that economic growth helped reducing the public debt/GDP 
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8 In parallel to these developments, it is worth noting that economic growth helped reducing the public debt/GDP 
ratio, contributing to the fact that during Franco's dictatorship there was no public debt crisis (Esteve and Tamarit 
2018). 
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Let NtjY ,  define the potential per capita GDP without the economic or political liberalization and let 
I
tjY ,  be the potential per capita GDP in response to the underlying treatment. Our strategy is to 
separately estimate the contribution of economic and political liberalization to subnational economic 
growth rates. This implies that we are estimating a vector of post-treatment effects 
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Which implies that the effect of liberalization is proportional to the difference between the outcome 
with and without the institutional transition. The principal challenge for the econometrician is to 
estimate the level of per capita GDP in the hypothetical absence of the institutional transition, NtY ,1 . The 
outcome in the absence of the treatment serves as a proxy for the counterfactual scenario and is 
informative of the level of per capita GDP in the absence of liberalization. Given that the missing 
counterfactual scenario is not observed by the econometrician, we reproduce NtY ,1  by estimating a latent 
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Where   is the set of unobserved technology shocks common to all countries and provinces, X  is a 
vector of pre-liberalization per capita GDP and auxiliary covariates, t  is a vector of parameters, t  is 
the vector of common unobserved factors, and i  is a vector of unknown factor loadings. Notice that 
transitory shocks are i.i.d. distributed and are captured by the stochastic disturbance term, tj , . The 
latent factor model conveys several advantages in estimating the missing counterfactual growth 
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trajectories. First, the model allows for heterogeneous response to unobserved factors and, by 
embedding time trends into the outcome model, a reasonably smooth per capita GDP trajectory can be 
recovered. In this respect, we assume that the factor count is fixed over time and therefore exhibits no 
structural breaks. Thanks to the latent factor model, we are able to uncover the counterfactual scenarios 
associated with the political and economic liberalization by estimating the combination of countries in 
the donor pool which may approximate the true characteristics of each affected province. This particular 
combination of countries is akin to an artificial (i.e. synthetic) control group which has growth and 
development characteristics similar to each Spanish province considered, except that it was unaffected 
by the institutional change deriving from the economic and political liberalizations.  
 
Let  12,...  JwwW  be a vector of weights such that jwj  0  where each value of W  presents a 
potential synthetic control for each Spanish province. For any such combination, the counterfactual 
growth trajectory can be constructed by reweighing the control group so that each synthetic Spanish 
province is set to match country-level tj,X  and some of its pre- 0T  per capita GDP. For given W, the 



















































jtW wwXwYwY   
 
Where the synthetic control is represented by a 1J  vector of weights  ',... 12  JwwW  
which are restricted to be additive and non-negative so that the growth and development characteristics 
of the control group fall inside the convex hull of the Spanish provinces and reproduce their actual 










ttjj YYw  where   0,...,1 Tt .  To ensure that 
weights are not chosen arbitrarily, we follow Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et. al. (2010) 
and seek the synthetic control group that best captures the pre-liberalization per capita GDP levels. For 
the set of positive constraints  kvvvV ,..., 21 , W  is chosen to minimize the discrepancy between the 
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w . The set of non-negative constraints  kvvvV ,..., 21  reflects the 
importance of the k-th auxiliary covariate in reproducing the values of per capita GDP for each treated 
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province. Equation (3) can be minimized by relying on constrained quadratic optimization and we chose 
V such that  VW  minimizes the root mean squared prediction error (RMSE) relative to NtY ,1  which 







tJJtt YwYwY VV  for some pre-liberalization period  00 ,...2,1 T . 
Compared to the more traditional difference-in-differences approach, the synthetic control method 
imposes a less restrictive functional assumption on the estimation process by letting W force the data 
to exhibit similar trends as the treated provinces in the pre-liberalization period. By comparing the 
growth trajectories of actual Spanish provinces after the liberalization with their synthetic peers that did 
















ttjjtt YYYwY . Provided that the prediction error is 
minimized along with the similarity of trajectories in pre-intervention period, the post-treatment effect 




 3.2 Reliability of the Donor Pool 
 
One of the most important questions behind the ability of our empirical strategy to isolate the impact of 
the 1959 Stabilization Plan and the 1979 democratic transition on economic growth trajectory, concerns 
the composition of the donor pool. By default, a reliable donor pool that permits the isolation of the 
underlying effects should be tainted neither by the presence of full-scale economic liberalization nor by 
an all-encompassing institutional transition towards mature democracy. An obvious way to parse out 
the treatment effects of interest would be to compare the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces to the 
provinces in other countries. This particular approach is constrained by two inherent limitations. First, 
the regional data on economic growth prior to 1959 is scarce and includes countries which, by and large, 
have undergone either deep or large-scale economic liberalization prior to our treatment year such as 
Australia, United States, Canada, Denmark and Sweden among several others. This implies that any 
comparison of Spanish provinces with the regions, states or provinces of these countries is unlikely to 
provide a meaningful interpretation of the 1959 Stabilization Plan. And second, the availability of 
regional GDP data in countries that have not undergone some elements of the economic liberalization 
significantly longer than Spain and have similar levels of per capita income such as Greece, Portugal 
and Slovenia is equally scarce or missing for the period prior to the Stabilization Plan. Even though 
data starting in 1950 is available at the regional level for some countries such as India, Brazil and 
Argentina (Genniaoli et. al. 2014), the per capita income difference between Spanish provinces and 
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these regions looms large over time and is unlikely to provide a meaningful interpretation of the 
estimates. 
 
Under these conditions, the comparison of Spanish provinces and other countries becomes plausible. 
To isolate the treatment effects of interest, we impose two criteria on the selection of the donor pool. 
First, to isolate the growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan, we only consider those countries which 
down to the present day have not yet implemented a full-scale economic liberalization. By relying on 
Miller et. al. (2020) index of economic freedom, we consider only those countries with the level of 
economic freedom below the world median. This allows us to partially (i.e. albeit imperfectly) remove 
the presence of large-scale economic liberalization reminiscent of the 1959 Stabilization Plan from the 
donor pool and isolate the treatment effect by estimating the counterfactual growth trajectory of 
provinces that have similar pre-1959 growth process characteristics but have, at the same time, not 
undergone a large-scale economic liberalization. And second, to isolate the economic growth effect of 
democratic transition, we compare the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces with the sample of 
countries that have not yet achieved the status of full democracy down to the present day. The most 
plausible approach would be to compare the provinces with a sample of countries that did not undergo 
democratization down to the present day. However, it should be taken into account that the gradual 
spread of democracy after the Third Wave in 1980s, implies that the potential donor pool of non-
democracies has been shrinking over time and would now include countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, 
Russia, Venezuela and Iran which, given the per capita income difference, might not fall within the 
convex hull of the growth and development characteristics of Spanish provinces. We partially address 
this particular limitation by considering only those countries in the donor pool that have an average 
value of Polity IV democracy index for the period of our investigation (i.e. 1950-2016) below the 
median cut-off. This effectively safeguards our donor pool from containing any source of large-scale 
democratization leading to the development of full and mature democracies such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland to cite a few examples. 
 
4 Data 
Our treatment sample comprises 50 Spanish provinces9 for the period 1950-2016. The dependent 
variable is per capita GDP adjusted for PPP at 2005 constant prices (Gennaioli et. al. 2014) which serves 
to capture the patterns of growth trajectories across provinces. To isolate the impact of political and 
economic liberalizations, we match the growth trajectory of each province with a donor pool of 102 
                                                          
9 A Coruña, Álava, Albacete, Alicante, Almería, Asturias, Ávila, Badajoz, Illes Balears, Barcelona, Bizkaia, 
Burgos, Cáceres, Cádiz, Cantabria, Castellón, Ciudad Real, Córdoba, Cuenca, Girona, Granada, Guadalajara, 
Guipúzcoa, Huelva, Huesca, Jaén, La Rioja, Las Palmas, León, Lleida, Lugo, Madrid, Málaga, Murcia, Navarra, 
Ourense, Palencia, Pontevedra, Salamanca, Santa Cruz de Tenerife, Segovia, Sevilla, Soria, Tarragona, Teruel, 
Toledo, Valencia, Valladolid, Zamora and Zaragoza. 
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countries10 (Bolt et. al. 2018) for the same respective period using the synthetic control analysis. Since 
the full treatment effect of economic and political liberalization is contingent on the degree of 
liberalization in the donor pool, we adopt two non-lenient criteria to isolate the treatment effects of 
interest. First, to pars  the treatment effect of the economic liberalization from the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan, we match the growth trajectories of provinces with a restricted donor pool of countries where the 
same degree of economic liberalization has not been perceptible for a long period of time after the 1959 
Stabilization Plan was adopted. Our approach is to consider only the restricted donor pool of countries 
with a low degree of economic liberalization and thus we rely on the Miller et al. (2020) index of 
economic inst tutions t  construct the cut-off. By considering countries with a relatively low degree of 
economic liberalization, we are able to partially parse out the treatment effect of the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan since this provides us with the variation in the donor pool where the countries with a high degree 
of economic liberalization are appropriately excluded. More specifically, from our donor pool we 
exclude those countries with above-median level of index of economic freedom which provides us 
restricted and, yet, substantial variation in growth performance where large-scale economic 
liberalization is more or less absent. For each province-level specification, this yields a strongly 
balanced panel of 3,484 province/country-matched observations with a donor pool of 51 countries11 
with below-median degree of economic liberalization. The total size of the sample for the full sample 
of provinces provides us 167,232 observations in the data grid used to estimate the counterfactual 
scenario. 
 
Second, to estimate the full treatment effect of political liberalization (i.e., democratization), we match 
the growth trajectories of provinces with a donor pool where the degree of political liberalization in our 
investigation period (1950-2016) is reasonably low. Countries that have been mature democracies like 
Australia or United States cannot serve as meaningful control sample for the Spanish provinces because 
a full political liberalization has been present throughout the overall period. We adopt a more stringent 
cut-off and consider countries with a Marshall and Gurr (2020) Polity2 score below the median of the 
                                                          
10 Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, The Netherlands, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
11 Albania, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
China, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Macedonia, Madagascar, Madrid, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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countries10 (Bolt et. al. 2018) for the same respective period using the synthetic control analysis. Since 
the full treatment effect of economic and political liberalization is contingent on the degree of 
liberalization in the donor pool, we adopt two non-lenient criteria to isolate the treatment effects of 
interest. First, to parse the treatment effect of the economic liberalization from the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan, we match the growth trajectories of provinces with a restricted donor pool of countries where the 
same degree of economic liberalization has not been perceptible for a long period of time after the 1959 
Stabilization Plan was adopted. Our approach is to consider only the restricted donor pool of countries 
with a low degree of economic liberalization and thus we rely on the Miller et al. (2020) index of 
economic institutions to construct the cut-off. By considering countries with a relatively low degree of 
economic liberalization, we are able to partially parse out the treatment effect of the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan since this provides us with the variation in the donor pool where the countries with a high degree 
of economic liberalization are appropriately excluded. More specifically, from our donor pool we 
exclude those countries with above-median level of index of economic freedom which provides us 
restricted and, yet, substantial variation in growth performance where large-scale economic 
liberalization is more or less absent. For each province-level specification, this yields a strongly 
balanced panel of 3,484 province/country-matched observations with a donor pool of 51 countries11 
with below-median degree of economic liberalization. The total size of the sample for the full sample 
of provinces provides us 167,232 observations in the data grid used to estimate the counterfactual 
scenario. 
 
Second, to estimate the full treatment effect of political liberalization (i.e., democratization), we match 
the growth trajectories of provinces with a donor pool where the degree of political liberalization in our 
investigation period (1950-2016) is reasonably low. Countries that have been mature democracies like 
Australia or United States cannot serve as meaningful control sample for the Spanish provinces because 
a full political liberalization has been present throughout the overall period. We adopt a more stringent 
cut-off and consider countries with a Marshall and Gurr (2020) Polity2 score below the median of the 
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distribution. This ensures that the possible control samples are less likely tainted by the presence of 
political liberalization to parse out a plausible effect of democratization on subnational economic 
growth. Considering the countries with Polity2 score below the median of the 102 countries from the 
baseline donor pool restricts our donor pool to 59 countries12 with a low overall degree of political 
liberalization for the period 1950-2016 which provides a strongly b lanced panel of 4,623 
province/country-paired observations a  totals 221,904 observ tions in the data gri  used to estim te 
the counterfactual growth scenario associated with the democratization. 
 
Aside from the pre-liberalization per capita GDP dynamics, we also consider several auxiliary 
covariates to further grasp the similarities between Spanish provinces and the donor pool, based on the 
covariates which are unaffected by the economic and political liberalization. These covariates include 
time i variant geographical char cteristics (Nunn and Pu a 2012) such as size of the la d area, latitude
and longitude coordinates, island and a landlocked dummy variables to capture the geographic and 
climatic similarity between provinces and country-level control samples. We also consider legal history 
(La Porta et. al. 1998) as an auxiliary covariate to e sure that Spanish provinces ca  be matched with 
the countries sharing similar civil law tradition, as well as demographic variables such as population 
size and density to grasp demographic similarities. The data on population size of Spanish provinces 
comes from Institudo Nacional de Estadistica province-level population series. Lastly, we also match 
Spanish provinces with the donor pool based on the level of political development to ensure that 
provinces are compared to the jurisdictions with a somewhat similar level of political development. To 
this end, we consider the variables such as constraints on the executive and the level of democracy, both 
of which come from Marshall and Gurr (2020). 
 
Table 1 presents the actual and matched pre-stabilization per capita GDP and auxiliary covariate 
balanced between few selected provinces and their synthetic control groups.13 The comparison reveals 
reasonably high degree of similarity between the actual growth trajectories of provinces and their 
synthetic counterparts. For instance, the economic growth trajectory of Madrid appears to be 
sufficiently well matched with its country-level synthetic control group. More specifically, the growth 
trajectory of the synthetic Madrid has almost identical level of per capita GDP, similar demographic 
patterns and comparable physical geographic characteristics as the actual Madrid with the RMSE at 
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around 6 percent of the pre-stabilization margin. Low degree of covariate imbalance is equally 
perceivable in other provinces. In a similar vein, Table 2 lays out the pre-democratization covariate 
balance comparisons. Likewise, the growth trajectories of provinces in pre-democratization period seem 
to b  well matched with their synthetic counterparts. Given the le gth of the pre-democr tization 
training and validation period, the lagged term of per capita GDP is added to the battery of covariates 
to smooth the trajectories and used to match them with low imbalance in pre-treatment period. The table 
strikes out substantial similarity of the actual and matched growth trajectories not only in terms of pre-
democratization per capita GDP dynamics but also in terms of auxiliary covariates. For instance, the 
physical geographic characteristics of the synthetic control groups appear to be aligned with the actual 
characteristics of the treated provinces. For example, the synthetic control group for Madrid has similar 
latitude and longitude coordinates, a characteristic of being non-island and partially landlocked whilst 
having a similar population siz comp rabl  executive constraints, and coming almost exclusively from
a civil law legal tradition. The size of RMSE appears to be low and within the conventional criteria of 
reasonably good fit. For the 1959 stabilization plan, the RMSE varies between 0.03 (for Jaén) and 0.12 
(for Bizkaia) and s within Adhikari and Alm (2016) quality of fit bounds. Figure 1 depicts province-
level RMSEs for both treatments along with respective bounds. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2118
13 
 
around 6 percent of the pre-stabilization margin. Low degree of covariate imbalance is equally 
perceivable in other provinces. In a similar vein, Table 2 lays out the pre-democratization covariate 
balance comparisons. Likewise, the growth trajectories of provinces in pre-democratization period seem 
to be well matched with their synthetic counterparts. Given the length of the pre-democratization 
training and validation period, the lagged term of per capita GDP is added to the battery of covariates 
to smooth the trajectories and used to match them with low imbalance in pre-treatment period. The table 
strikes out substantial similarity of the actual and matched growth trajectories not only in terms of pre-
democratization per capita GDP dynamics but also in terms of auxiliary covariates. For instance, the 
physical geographic characteristics of the synthetic control groups appear to be aligned with the actual 
characteristics of the treated provinces. For example, the synthetic control group for Madrid has similar 
latitude and longitude coordinates, a characteristic of being non-island and partially landlocked whilst 
having a similar population size, comparable executive constraints, and coming almost exclusively from 
a civil law legal tradition. The size of RMSE appears to be low and within the conventional criteria of 
reasonably good fit. For the 1959 stabilization plan, the RMSE varies between 0.03 (for Jaén) and 0.12 
(for Bizkaia) and is within Adhikari and Alm (2016) quality of fit bounds. Figure 1 depicts province-
level RMSEs for both treatments along with respective bounds. 
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 5.1. Baseline 
 
 5.1.1. Effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan 
 
Our synthetic control estimates indicate large-scale permanent growth improvement in response to the 
1959 Stabilization Plan as opposed to modest improved growth performance associated with the 1979 
democratization. On average, our estimates uncover 44 percent higher per capita GDP in response to 
the Stabilization Plan along with 10 percent higher per capita GDP after democratization. Therefore, 
our evidence seems to suggest that, in the case of Spanish provinces, economic transition seems to have 
had a relatively larger effect on economic growth than democratization. Figure 2 presents the growth 
effect of the Stabilization Plan and democratization over time. That is, the gap in per capita GDP 
triggered by each shock is broken down by year and accompanied by the 95% confidence bounds to 
better grasp the intertemporal statistical significance of the growth effects. Evidence unveils a positive 
per capita GDP gap that widens substantially over time. It indicates a series of permanent improvement 
in per capita GDP after the Stabilization Plan which is consistent with the notion of structural growth 
breakup. A similar results suggests that the plan laid out the set of fiscal, monetary and administrative 
reforms which provided the growth impetus allowing the Spanish provinces to achieve and sustain more 
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Table 1: Pre-Stabilization Plan Covariate Balance for Selected Provinces 
  Madrid Barcelona Sevilla Valencia Guipúzcoa A Coruña 
Pre-1959 Prediction Error 0.066 0.105 0.040 0.070 0.105 0.062 
  Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic 
Log GDP per capita in 1950 8.34 8.33 8.34 8.34 8.18 8.18 8.54 8.55 8.34 8.33 8.39 8.38 
Log GDP per capita in 1959 8.62 8.62 8.62 8.62 8.48 8.49 8.84 8.85 8.62 8.62 8.69 8.68 
Latitude 40.5 41.03 41.38 34.36 37.5 35.98 39.46 32.52 43.16 34.54 43.22 34.40 
Longitude -3.66 23.60 2.17 16.21 -5.5 13.83 -0,37 17.80 -2.16 21.60 -8.4 14.64 
Landlocked 1 0.43 0 0.10 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.19 0 0.08 
Island 0 0.17 0 0.27 0 0.12 0 0.28 0 0.28 0 0.26 
Log population size 7.60 8.84 7.76 8.11 7.02 8.48 7.21 8.38 5.97 7.81 6.87 8.14 
Log population density 1.38 2.26 1.19 2.35 2.52 2.52 2,06 2.62 1.61 2.38 2.10 2.55 
Log land area 8.99 11.20 8.95 10.47 9.54 11.00 9.28 11.01 7.59 10.20 8.98 10.69 
British common law 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Civil law 1 1 1 0.99 1 1 1 1 1 0.99 1 0.99 
Polity2 democracy score -7 -3.86 -7 -3.25 -7 -4.38 -7 -3.67 -7 -3.16 -7 -4.22 
Notes: the table presents covariate values of the actual provinces and their synthetic peers in the pre-stabilization period. 
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Table 2: Pre-Democratization Covariate Balance for Selected Provinces 
 Madrid Barcelona Sevilla Valencia Guipúzcoa A Coruña 
Pre-1959 Prediction Error 0.055 0.051 0.121 0.057 0.056 0.045 
 Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic Actual Synthetic 
Log gdp per capita in 1950 8.34 8.32 8.34 8.32 8.18 8.18 8.54 8.52 8.34 8.31 8.39 8.37 
Log GDP per capita (t-1) 8.87 8.86 8.87 8.86 9.52 9.28 9.09 9.08 8.87 8.86 8.94 8.93 
Log GDP per capita in 1978 9.44 9.43 9.44 9.43 9.32 9.32 9.68 9.67 9.44 9.43 9.53 9.52 
Latitude 40.5 43.67 41.38 40.24 37.5 38.87 39.46 41.28 43.16 42.38 43.22 42.72 
Longitude -3.66 12.16 2.17 10.30 -5.5 17.71 -0.37 13.59 -2.16 20.10 -8.4 11.84 
Landlocked 1 0.18 0 0.01 1 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Island 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.04 
Log population size 7.93 8.47 6.91 8.19 7.12 7.67 7.34 8.55 6.22 7.89 6.91 8.19 
Log population density 1.05 2.17 0.91 2.06 2.42 2.17 1.93 2.26 1.36 2.26 2.06 2.28 
Log land area 8.99 10.64 8.95 10.36 9.54 9.85 9.28 10.81 7.59 10.15 8.98 10.47 
British common law 0 0.04 0 0.06 0 0.04 0 0.04 0 0.09 0 0.04 
Civil law 1 0.96 1 0.94 1 0.96 1 0.96 1 0.91 1 0.96 
Executive constraints 1.20 2.27 1.20 1.46 1.20 2.16 1.20 2.62 1.20 2.40 1.20 2.08 
Notes: the table presents covariate values of the actual provinces and their synthetic peers in the pre-democratization period. 
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 5.1.1. Effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan 
 
Our synthetic control estimates indicate large-scale permanent growth improvement in response to the 
1959 Stabilization Plan as opposed to modest improved growth performance associated with the 1979 
democratization. On average, our estimates uncover 44 percent higher per capita GDP in response to 
the Stabilization Plan along with 10 percent higher per capita GDP after democratization. Therefore, 
our evidence seems to suggest that, in the case of Spanish provinces, economic transition seems to have 
had a relatively larger effect on economic growth than democratization. Figure 2 presents the growth 
effect of the Stabilization Plan and democratization over time. That is, the gap in per capita GDP 
triggered by each shock is broken down by year and accompanied by the 95% confidence bounds to 
better grasp the intertemporal statistical significance of the growth effects. Evidence unveils a positive 
per capita GDP gap that widens substantially over time. It indicates a series of permanent improvement 
in per capita GDP after the Stabilization Plan which is consistent with the notion of structural growth 
breakup. A similar results suggests that the plan laid out the set of fiscal, monetary and administrative 
reforms which provided the growth impetus allowing the Spanish provinces to achieve and sustain more 
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reform. Down to the present day, the growth effect’s sizes and their respective confidence bounds are 
clearly above the zero threshold, suggesting a statistically significant impact of the Stabilization Plan. 
Panel (b) lays out year-by-year growth effect of democratization. Compared to Panel (a), the notion of 
the structural breakup associated with the democratic transition is not present. Our estimates show that 
the positive growth effects mimic the characteristics of a temporary shock with positive growth impact 
that does not seem to be permanent but, on the contrary, appears to fizzle out down to the present day. 
On a substantive note, our estimates do not uncover evidence of a negative or null impact of democracy 
as claimed earlier by a handful of studies. On the contrary our results suggest that the temporary 
institutional shock emanating from democratization does not appear to have permanent growth effect 
unlike the 1959 Stabilization Plan. 
 
Figure 2: Intertemporal growth effect of 1959 stabilization plan and democratization 
  
 
Figure 3 decomposes the overall effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan and democratization by provinces 
focusing on province-specific average effect associated with each treatment. The evidence suggests 
marked provincial heterogeneity and several noteworthy disparities in the size of growth differentials. 
Panel (a) presents the province-specific effect of the stabilization plan, which is both positive and 
statistically significant for all provinces, ranging from low magnitude in provinces such as Huelva and 
Tarragona to very high in provinces such as Guipuzcoa and Cuenca. Panel (b) presents the 
corresponding distribution of the growth effect associated with democratization. Compared to the high 
average effect of the stabilization plan, accompanied by narrow confidence bounds, the effect of 
democratization across provinces is more homogeneous although characterized by wider confidence 
bounds. Although some provinces, especially Guadalajara and Tarragona, have a disproportionately 
high effect of democratization, most provinces are confronted with an effect that is close to null or even 
negative in some cases such as Alicante, Alava, Granada and Cádiz. Province-specific comparisons 
reiterate our theoretical notions and confirm large and permanent growth effect of 1959 Stabilization 




























































































































































































































(b) Effect of 1979 democratization by year
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Figure 3: Province-specific effect of stabilization and democratization 
(a) 1959 Stabilization Plan (b) 1979 Democratization 
  
 
Figure 4 presents the estimated per capita GDP gaps in response to the 1959 Stabilization Plan for 
selected provinces. The evidence readily indicates large gains associated with the macroeconomic 
liberalization. Growth gains seem to be immediate, permanent and tend to increase considerably over 
time. For instance, our estimates imply that the per capita GDP of Madrid is 83 percent higher than the 
per capita GDP of its synthetic control group. In the similar vein, the estimated per capita GDP gap of 
Barcelona is 134 percent whilst the corresponding gap for Guipuzcoa is 149 percent, respectively. The 
evidence largely suggests that Catalan (Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona) and Basque provinces 
(Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya) tend to have the largest and most robust growth premium from the 
1959 Stabilization Plan. The estimated gains tend to be closer to the baseline effect (i.e., 44 percent) in 
other provinces. For instance, the estimated per capita GDP gap in Sevilla, A Coruña and Valencia is 
substantially smaller compared to Basque and Catalan provinces, yet still sizeable and indicates the 
permanency of the structural break posited by the 1959 Stabilization Plan, that is positively perceivable 
across all provinces, even those that benefitted the least from the reforms (i.e., Huelva, Tarragona and 
Lugo).  
Figure 4: Growth Effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan for Selected Provinces 
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Figure 5 presents the composition of the synthetic control groups for the selected provinces in Figure 
4. The synthetic control groups present the convex combination of growth and characteristics of the set 
of countries from the donor pool that can best reproduce the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces 
but that were not affected by the 1959 Stabilization Plan or an equivalent institutional change. Notice 
that the countries considered for the composition of the synthetic control group are those that have an 
index of economic freedom below the full-sample median of our baseline panel to ensure that countries 
undergoing large-scale economic liberalization at some point in time in our investigation period are 
appropriately excluded from the donor pool. The evidence posits both contrasts and similarities in the 
composition of the synthetic control groups. The growth trajectory of Madrid prior to 1959 is best 
synthesized by a convex combination of pre-1959 per capita GDP and auxiliary covariates of Lebanon 
(38 percent), Poland (37 percent), Ukraine (17 percent), Cape Verde (7 percent), and Argentina (2 
percent). These convex characteristics yield a RMSE of about 6 percent which, given the scale of the 
effect, appears to be low and does not invoke the lack of fit as the underlying driver of the post-1959 
per capita GDP gap between Madrid and its synthetic control group. The respective synthetic control 
group for Barcelona is similar and consists of Lebanon (50 percent), Dominican Republic (11 percent), 
Cape Verde (9 percent), Ukraine (3 percent), Poland (1 percent), and Bangladesh (1 percent). The 
synthetic control group of Guipuzcoa, the province with the largest estimated growth gain from the 
1959 plan, comprises Lebanon (51 percent), Ukraine (28 percent), Cape Verde (19 percent), Dominican 
Republic (1 percent), and Slovenia (1 percent). The general thrust of the comparisons is that the most 
dominant country in the control group sharing similar implied level of per capita GDP prior to 1959 is 
Lebanon14 followed by others. The synthetic control groups do not seem to differ radically although 
they tend to have similar sets of countries present in the group that varying in the weight proportions 











                                                          
14 It should again be noted that the selection of countries is based on econometric methods based on objective 
information. Although the comparison of Madrid and Barcelona with Lebanon may be surprising with the levels 
of development observed today, these are not abnormal comparisons if we take into account the level of 
development of Lebanon and Spain before 1975 (when the Lebanese civil war began). 
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 5.1.2 In-Space Placebo Analysis 
 
The evidence so far indicates a positive per capita GDP gap associated with the 1959 Stabilization Plan 
that is perceivable across all provinces. Given the size of the gap, the question that remains is whether 
these gaps are statistically significant or not. To evaluate the significance of the estimated gaps, we ask 
whether the effects are driven by chance and rely on in-space placebo analysis to address these concerns. 
The approach consists in the iterative application of the synthetic control estimator to all unaffected 
countries in the donor pool that did not implement the 1959 Stabilization Plan. The general intuition 
behind such approach is simple. If the placebo analysis yields gaps of magnitude and size similar to the 
ones estimated for Spanish provinces, then it is unlikely that the synthetic control analysis would serve 
as a source of significance for the positive growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan. By contrast, if 
placebo analysis unveils the estimated gap for Spanish provinces as unusually large to the placebo gaps, 
then the notion f t e statistically significant growth effect becomes more credible. Notice that in the 
iterative application of the synthetic control estimator, the dataset is reassigned and shifts Spanish 
provinces from the treated set to the donor pool. This implies that countries from the donor pool are 
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index of economic freedom below the full-sample median of our baseline panel to ensure that countries 
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appropriately excluded from the donor pool. The evidence posits both contrasts and similarities in the 
composition of the synthetic control groups. The growth trajectory of Madrid prior to 1959 is best 
synthesized by a convex combination of pre-1959 per capita GDP and auxiliary covariates of Lebanon 
(38 percent), Poland (37 percent), Ukraine (17 percent), Cape Verde (7 percent), and Argentina (2 
percent). These convex characteristics yield a RMSE of about 6 percent which, given the scale of the 
effect, appears to be low and does not invoke the lack of fit as the underlying driver of the post-1959 
per capita GDP gap between Madrid and its synthetic control group. The respective synthetic control 
group for Barcelona is similar and consists of Lebanon (50 percent), Dominican Republic (11 percent), 
Cape Verde (9 percent), Ukraine (3 percent), Poland (1 percent), and Bangladesh (1 percent). The 
synthetic control group of Guipuzcoa, the province with the largest estimated growth gain from the 
1959 plan, comprises Lebanon (51 percent), Ukraine (28 percent), Cape Verde (19 percent), Dominican 
Republic (1 percent), and Slovenia (1 percent). The general thrust of the comparisons is that the most 
dominant country in the control group sharing similar implied level of per capita GDP prior to 1959 is 
Lebanon14 followed by others. The synthetic control groups do not seem to differ radically although 
they tend to have similar sets of countries present in the group that varying in the weight proportions 
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computing t  estimated effec in each plac bo iteration, we construct the distribution of the gaps for 
the countries where no 1959 Stabilization Plan was mpl mented.
 
The gen rated distribution of the internal placebo effec s (Galiani and Quistdorff 2017) po es a 
straightforward d rlying notion. If the distribution of placebo effect  yields effects being as large as 
the on s estimated for Spanish provi ces, then it is likely hat the timated growth effects are entirely 
d iven by chance, or by factors dis nctive from he 1959 plan. If the effects co tain random chance, t e 
probability f a chance-driv n effect should be reasonably h gh. Assumi g that the eff ct f institutional 
shock for the full post-treatment period is 1ˆ t , the distribution of in-place placebo effects is 
   1ˆ ˆ : 1Placebot jt j . We compute the two-tailed p-value for the effect of institutional shock as 
follows: 
 
            111 1
ˆ ˆ1





whereas the one-tailed p-values (for strictly positive effects) are    1 1ˆ ˆp-value Pr Placebot t . Yet, 
since the 1959 Stabilization Plan is not randomly distributed across the treatment sample, the placebo 
distributions may not serve as a classical randomization inference. Given that the strict exogeneity 
assumption is unlikely to be defended in these circumstances, the obtained probabilities indicate the 
proportion of countries that have the estimated growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan at least as 
large as the baseline effects for Spanish provinces. If the treatment and control samples are marked by 
substantial and persistent differences in outcomes and auxilarly covariates, we adjust the set of placebo 
coefficients for the quality of match in pre-1959 period by excluding the five-fold RMSE multiples of 
placebo effects as suggested earlier by Abadie et. al. (2010) to generate a valid distribution of pseudo 
t-statistics, and compute the relevant p-values, permitting statistical inference on the growth effect of 
1959 Stabilization Plan. 
 
Figure 6 presents the in-space placebo analyses of the growth effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan for the 
selected provinces. As it becomes apparent, the synthetic control estimator provides a good fit of the 
actual growth trajectories of Spanish provinces with their synthetic control groups. The general notion 
of the placebo effects is that post-1959 gaps appear to be unusual for the Spanish provinces with a clear 
departure from the zero-gap threshold in the first post-treatment year of the 1959 Stabilization Plan. 
The gaps are particularly large for the wealthier provinces, namely, Madrid, Barcelona and Guipúzcoa 
whilst being sizeable but markedly smaller for less affluent provinces such as A Coruña or Sevilla. The 
placebo analysis also conveys several important implications that hinge on the significance of the 
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estimated gaps. First, per capita GDP trajectories cannot be well reproduced for some countries in pre-
1959 period by a convex combination of growth and development characteristics. For the countries 
where pre-1959 growth trajectories can be reasonably well reproduced, post-1959 gaps do not seem to 
be comparable with the gaps for Spanish provinces. If the synthetic control groups failed to provide a 
good fit for the provinces in the years preceding the Stabilization Plan, our interpretation would be that 
the gap is possibly driven by the lack of fit rather than by the Stabilization Plan itself. 
 
 





Figure 7 presents the distribution of p-values associated with the growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization 

















































































































































































































































































The comparison of p-values also helps us to gauge whether the growth effect of the Stabilization Plan 
is either temporary or permanent and if such differences are perceptible across provinces. Evidence 
suggests that the growth effect appears to be particularly strong in wealthier provinces, especially 
Barcelona and Guipúzcoa whilst appearing to be somewhat weaker elsewhere. In richer provinces, the 
p-values appear to be around or below the 10% significance threshold, which reiterates the empirical 
support for the notion that the 1959 Stabilization Plan had a particularly favourable growth impact on 
richer provinces. The placebo analyses confirm the uniqueness of the estimated gaps that do not seem 
to be perceptible once the policy treatment is permuted to the other countries in the donor pool. 
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The comparison of p-values also helps us to gauge whether the growth effect of the Stabilization Plan 
is either temporary or permanent and if such differences are perceptible across provinces. Evidence 
suggests that the growth effect appears to be particularly strong in wealthier provinces, especially 
Barcelona and Guipúzcoa whilst appearing to be somewhat weaker elsewhere. In richer provinces, the 
p-values appear to be around or below the 10% significance threshold, which reiterates the empirical 
support for the notion that the 1959 Stabilization Plan had a particularly favourable growth impact on 
richer provinces. The placebo analyses confirm the uniqueness of the estimated gaps that do not seem 
to be perceptible once the policy treatment is permuted to the other countries in the donor pool. 
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The comparison of p-values also helps us to gauge whether the growth effect of the Stabilization Plan 
is either temporary or permanent and if such differences are perceptible across provinces. Evidence 
suggests that the growth effect appears to be particularly strong in wealthier provinces, especially 
Barcelona and Guipúzcoa whilst appearing to be somewhat weaker elsewhere. In richer provinces, the 
p-values appear to be around or below the 10% significance threshold, which reiterates the empirical 
support for the notion that the 1959 Stabilization Plan had a particularly favourable growth impact on 
richer provinces. The placebo analyses confirm the uniqueness of the estimated gaps that do not seem 
to be perceptible once the policy treatment is permuted to the other countries in the donor pool. 
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5.1.3 Effect of Democratization 
 
Figure 8 presents the province-level effects of democratization on economic growth’s trajectories. The 
effect captures the overall impact of the transition to democracy after the end of Franco’s regime in 
1979. Given that the donor pool only comprises those countries having remained either non-
democracies or weak democracies after the onset of democratic transition in Spain, the notion that the 
underlying per capita GDP gaps reflect the effect of democratization becomes more plausible and less 
susceptible the presence of distinctive shocks. Evidence suggests that wealthier provinces, especially 
Madrid, Catalan and Basque provinces, seem to have a modest growth gain associated with the 
democratization relative to the respective counterfactual scenario. For instance, per capita GDP of 
Madrid down to the present day is about 23 percent higher than the level implied by the hypothetical 
absence of democratic transition. The corresponding gaps for Barcelona and Guipúzcoa are 21 percent, 
and 18 percent, respectively. For these provinces, the impact of democratization can be best described 
as negative in the short term whilst being positive and permanent in the long-term perspective. Given 
that pre-1979 discrepancy between the actual growth trajectories and their synthetic peers seems to be 
low, we may interpret this as evidence that the post-1979 growth effect is driven by democratization 
itself rather than by the lack of fit. Other provinces tend to have considerably smaller growth gains in 
response to democratization. For instance, the actual growth trajectories of A Coruña, Sevilla and 
Valencia posit a short-lived upward departure from the trajectories of their respective synthetic control 
group.  
In summary, in the short term the effect of democratization appears to be positive and uncovers some 
of that growth premium associated with the transition to democracy that has been previously recognized 
in scholarly literature. Nonetheless, such premium appears to be temporary and tends to fizzle out down 
up to the present day. The positive growth gain seems to come to halt around the period of the 2008 
financial crisis. Unlike the more affluent provinces, the growth improvement triggered by the 
democratization does not seem to persist, leading to a nearly complete convergence of the observed 
growth trajectories with their synthetic counterparts. In some cases, such as Valencia, the counterfactual 
growth trajectory by the end of our post-treatment period appears to be higher than the actual growth 
trajectory. Yet, the resulting difference seems to be small and does not seem to indicate discernible 
effect that could invoke the notion of high statistical significance. 
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Figure 9 presents the synthetic control groups used to approximate the counterfactual growth 
trajectories associated with democratization. Notice that the donor pool consists of countries that were 
either weak democracies or non-democracies up to the present day.15 As it becomes clear, the 
                                                          
15 In the ideal setup, the donor pool should comprise non-democracies only. However, the number of non-
democracies gradually becomes very small, coinciding with the third wave of democratization (Mukand and 
Rodrik 2020), and typically only includes countries with the per capita income significantly below the level of 
Spain and its provinces. Using the updated dichotomous indicator of democracy (Boix and Stokes 2003), our 
donor pool of non-democracies would include: Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Hong Kong, 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Oman, Russia, Rwanda, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Synthetic control 
analyses indicate that the synthetic control groups of most provinces load heavily on Singapore with the weight 






















































































































































































































































































composition of the synthetic control groups is dominated by Central European countries, East Asian 
countries, and a few others. For instance, the growth trajectory of Madrid prior to 1979 can be best 
synthesized by a convex combination of growth and development characteristics of Czech Republic (55 
percent), Slovenia (18 percent), Hungary (11 percent), Cape Verde (7 percent), Dominican Republic (5 
percent), Hong Kong (4 percent), and Lebanon (1 percent). Compared to the synthetic control group for 
1959 Stabilization Plan, the gravity of the group is concentrated among Central European countries that 
did not embark on the path of democratic transition in 197  along with a diminishing weight share of 
Lebanon. Similarly, the synthetic control group for Barcelona is dominated by the presence of Czech 
Republic (45 percent) and Slovenia (26 percent), respectively. In both cases, the synthetic control 
groups fail to yield the lack of pre-1979 fit with a RMSE around 0.05, which ensures that shocks other 
than democratization do not seem to be the dominant force behind the counterfactual scenario. For the 
Basque provinces, the composition of synthetic control group features similar countries although in 
different proportions that probably correspond to the small size of the area. For instance, the growth 
trajectory of Guipúzcoa prior to 1979 is best reproduced by the convex combination of growth and 
development characteristics of Slovenia (31 percent), Czech Republic (29 percent), Estonia (18 
percent), Lebanon (8 percent), Dominican Republic (6 percent), Singapore (6 percent), and Mauritius 
(3 percent). A similar structure of the synthetic control group is apparent for Valencia and A Coruña. 
By contrast, the only province with a markedly distinctive composition of the synthetic control group 
in our analysis is Sevilla, which also coincides with substantially a lower overall growth gain associated 
with democratization. Prior to the onset of the democratic transition, the growth trajectory of Sevilla 
without the presence of democracy in 1979 is best synthesized as a convex combination of implied 
growth and development characteristics of Slovenia (48 percent), Lebanon (25 percent), Hungary (11 
percent), Dominican Republic (7 percent), Hong Kong (5 percent), Cape Verde (3 percent), and 
Argentina (<1 percent). Compared to the wealthier provinces (i.e., Madrid, Basque and Catalan 
provinces), the share of Lebano  in Sevilla’s synthetic control group is considerably larger which 
possibly owes to the climatic, geographic, and per capita GDP-wise similarities between the two 
regions. Still the most dominant country in Sevilla’s synthetic control group appears to be Slovenia at 
a markedly higher proportion than in the other provinces, which implies that the counterfactual growth 
trend in response to the democratization derives itself from a European country of si ilar size and 
similar temperate climate, which unlike Sevilla, did not undergo the transition to democracy by the end 
of 1970s.  
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Figure 9 presents the synthetic control groups used to approximate the counterfactual growth 
trajectories associated with democratization. Notice that the donor pool consists of countries that were 
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composition of the synthetic control groups is dominated by Central European countries, East Asian 
countries, and a few others. For instance, the growth trajectory of Madrid prior to 1979 can be best 
synthesized by a convex combination of growth and development characteristics of Czech Republic (55 
percent), Slovenia (18 percent), Hungary (11 percent), Cape Verde (7 percent), Dominican Republic (5 
percent), Hong Kong (4 percent), and Lebanon (1 percent). Compared to the synthetic control group for 
1959 Stabilization Plan, the gravity of the group is concentrated among Central European countries that 
did not embark on the path of democratic transition in 1979 along with a diminishing weight share of 
Lebanon. Similarly, the synthetic control group for Barcelona is dominated by the presence of Czech 
Republic (45 percent) and Slovenia (26 percent), respectively. In both cases, the synthetic control 
groups fail to yield the lack of pre-1979 fit with a RMSE around 0.05, which ensures that shocks other 
than democratization do not seem to be the dominant force behind the counterfactual scenario. For the 
Basque provinces, the composition of synthetic control group features similar countries although in 
different proportions that probably correspond to the small size of the area. For instance, the growth 
trajectory of Guipúzcoa prior to 1979 is best reproduced by the convex combination of growth and 
development characteristics of Slovenia (31 percent), Czech Republic (29 percent), Estonia (18 
percent), Lebanon (8 percent), Dominican Republic (6 percent), Singapore (6 percent), and Mauritius 
(3 percent). A similar structure of the synthetic control group is apparent for Valencia and A Coruña. 
By contrast, the only province with a markedly distinctive composition of the synthetic control group 
in our analysis is Sevilla, which also coincides with substantially a lower overall growth gain associated 
with democratization. Prior to the onset of the democratic transition, the growth trajectory of Sevilla 
without the presence of democracy in 1979 is best synthesized as a convex combination of implied 
growth and development characteristics of Slovenia (48 percent), Lebanon (25 percent), Hungary (11 
percent), Dominican Republic (7 percent), Hong Kong (5 percent), Cape Verde (3 percent), and 
Argentina (<1 percent). Compared to the wealthier provinces (i.e., Madrid, Basque and Catalan 
provinces), the share of Lebanon in Sevilla’s synthetic control group is considerably larger which 
possibly owes to the climatic, geographic, and per capita GDP-wise similarities between the two 
regions. Still the most dominant country in Sevilla’s synthetic control group appears to be Slovenia at 
a markedly higher proportion than in the other provinces, which implies that the counterfactual growth 
trend in response to the democratization derives itself from a European country of similar size and 
similar temperate climate, which unlike Sevilla, did not undergo the transition to democracy by the end 
of 1970s.  
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Figure 10 presents the in-space placebo analyses of the growth effect of 1979 democratization akin to 
the placebo analysis of the Stabilization Plan in Figure 6. Both the visual inspection and a more rigorous 
analysis jointly suggest that the synthetic control estimator provides a reasonably good fit of the actual 
growth trajectories of Spanish provinces with their synthetic counterparts. The general thrust of the 
placebo effects is that the per capita GDP gaps after 1979 appear to be unusually large for the richer 
Spanish provinces (i.e., Madrid, Barcelona and Guipúzcoa) with a clear upward take-off from the zero-
gap threshold in the immediate post-treatment years after the democratic transition. Whereas the gaps 
are particularly large for the wealthier provinces, they seem to be short-lived and temporary for less 
affluent provinces, namely, A Coruña, Valencia and Sevilla. The placebo analysis also uncovers several 
important implications that shape the conclusions on the significance of the estimated gaps. First, per 
capita GDP trajectories cannot be well reproduced for some countries in pre-democratization period by 
a convex combination of growth and development characteristics. For the countries where pre-1979 
growth trajectories can be reasonably well reproduced by the implied growth trajectories in the donor 
pool, post-1979 gaps clearly do not seem to be comparable with the gaps for Spanish provinces. If the 
synthetic control groups failed to provide a good fit for the provinces in the years before the 
democratization, our interpretation would be that the gap is possibly driven by the lack of fit rather than 






























Figure 11 presents the distribution of p-values linked to the economic growth effect of democratization 
exhibited for the six respective provinces over time for the full post-treatment period. The comparison 
of p-values also allows us to ponder on the growth effect of democratization and determine whether it 
is either temporary or permanent and if such differences are obvious across provinces. The evidence 
suggests that the growth effect appears to be particularly strong in wealthier provinces, especially 
Barcelona and Guipúzcoa, but less than those associated to the Stabilization Plan. Elsewhere the growth 
effect of democratization appears to be temporary with the gap relative to the placebo distributions 
disappearing up to the present day. In richer provinces, the p-values appear to be around or below the 
10% significance threshold but not elsewhere. These contrasts jointly reinforce the empirical support 
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capita GDP trajectories cannot be well reproduced for some countries in pre-democratization period by 
a convex combination of growth and development characteristics. For the countries where pre-1979 
growth trajectories can be reasonably well reproduced by the implied growth trajectories in the donor 
pool, post-1979 gaps clearly do not seem to be comparable with the gaps for Spanish provinces. If the 
synthetic control groups failed to provide a good fit for the provinces in the years before the 
democratization, our interpretation would be that the gap is possibly driven by the lack of fit rather than 
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previous evidence (Acemoglu et al. 2019. Over time, the effect of democratization appears to be 
temporary and tends to disappear down to the present, with the exception of a handful of provinces that 
are either larger, richer, and more urbanized than the rest of Spain. The placebo analyses confirm the 
uniqueness of the estimated gaps for these provinces that do not seem to be perceptible once the policy 
treatment is permuted to the other countries in the donor pool, couple with a weak and temporary effect 
of democratization on economic growth elsewhere. 
 





To reconcile the relative strengths of both types of growth effects considered in our analysis, we 
compare the magnitudes of the 1959 Stabilization Plan and 1979 democratization across all provinces 
and in the full set of post-treatment periods. This approach allows us to determine the effectiveness of 
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counterfactual scenarios. In figure 12, we build the probability density curves for the per capita GDP 
gaps in response to t e democratization and Stabilization Plan. That is, we build the density curves for 
the differences between the per capita GDP of real provinces and the per capita GDP of their 
corresponding synthetic control groups for both the 1959 economic liberalization and 1979 political 
liberalization. The comparative assessment of the relative efficacy of both reforms revolves around 
three insights that become apparent. First, the large and positive growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan prevails. More specifically, the distribution of the 1959 growth effect is left-skewed with a 
relatively low kurtosis. This implies that a broad distribution of the reasonably strong growth effect of 
the Stabilization Plan that is clearly above the zero threshold is perceivable. Second, the distribution of 
the growth effect of democratic transition appears to be leptokurtic without left-tailed skewness. This 
pattern de-emphasizes a broad-based strong and positive growth gain and, instead, emphasizes a 
reasonably narrow distribution of low-to-moderate growth effect of democratization, given that at least 
a fraction of the overall effect is negative, differently from the Stabilization Plan. On balance, the 
positive effect of democratizati n is prevalent, but it seems to be considerably smaller than the positive 
effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan.  
 
Figure 12: Probability density curve for the growth effect of economic and political liberalization 
 
 
 5.2 Internal vs. external effect of 1959 Stabilization Plan 
 
One of the remaining caveats regarding the estimated economic growth effects concerns the distinction 
between the external and internal effect of the economic liberalization created by the 1959 Stabilization 
Plan. This particular distinction is crucial for establishing plausible counterfactual growth scenarios in 
response to the institutional changes taken into consideration. The evidence so far roughly indicates 
large-scale growth gains arising from the Stabilization Plan, and hinge on the comparison of Spanish 
provinces to the sample of countries having a low degree of economic liberalization up to the present 
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Woods system before Spain implemented its economic liberalization whilst others had no such access. 
Using the former set of countries as a control group, a plausible counterfactual scenario can be estimated 
by comparing Spanish provinces with a reference group of low-liberalization countries with access to 
the IMF. This type of scenario can possibly illustrate the growth effects of economic liberalization under 
the access to the institutional arrangements provided by the International Monetary Fund and other 
associated institutions. Using the latter set of countries as control group, the estimated counterfactual 
scenario can be estimated by leveraging the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces against the 
reference group having similar level of economic development, low level of economic liberalization up 
to the present day, and no access to the IMF in the years around the implementation of the Stabilization 
Plan, which can illustrate whether the latter posited an external shock for the economic growth at the 
subnational level. 
 
To capture the internal versus external effects of economic liberalization, we compare the growth 
trajectories of Spanish provinces with two blocks of the donor pool. The first block consists of 22 
countries16 which have maintained a low degree of economic liberalization until the present day but had 
access to the IMF before 1959. By matching the growth trajectories of provinces with this particular 
sample, we are able to parse out the “internal” effect of the Stabilization Plan. In contrast, the second 
block comprises 29 countries17 which also maintained a low degree of economic liberalization until the 
present day with no access to the IMF before 1959. Matching the respective growth trajectories allows 
us to determine whether the Stabilization Plan can be associated with an “external” growth effect. 
 
Figure 13 presents the estimated internal and external growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan for 
the selected provinces also reported in the baseline analysis. The evidence unequivocally suggests large-
scale “internal” growth gains emanating from the economic liberalization. In particular, the growth 
trajectories of Spanish provinces prior to 1959 tend to move in tandem with their synthetic control 
groups whilst producing a clear upward departure in the years after the Stabilization Plan. For all 
respective provinces, the gains are particularly large and indicate widespread improvements in the 
economic growth in response to the economic liberalization. These improvements appear to be both 
immediate and permanent, pointing out a reasonably strong structural break. Pointwise, the estimated 
per capita GDP gap in the last year of our post-treatment period ranges from +80% in Sevilla to +177% 
in Guipúzcoa. From a general perspective, the estimated gaps are closely related to the contrasts in the 
baseline effect and show that the Basque and Catalan provinces tend to have the largest growth effect 
whereas southern provinces have the lowest estimated per capita GDP gap. The resulting gaps indicate 
                                                          
16 Argentina, Bolivia, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam.  
17 Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ghana, 
Kosovo, Madagascar, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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counterfactual scenarios. In figure 12, we build the probability density curves for the per capita GDP 
gaps in response to the democratization and Stabilization Plan. That is, we build the density curves for 
the differences between the per capita GDP of real provinces and the per capita GDP of their 
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liberalization. The comparative assessment of the relative efficacy of both reforms revolves around 
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Woods system before Spain implemented its economic liberalization whilst others had no such access. 
Using the former set of countries as a control group, a plausible counterfactual scenario can be estimated 
by comparing Spanish provinces with a reference group of low-liberalization countries with access to 
the IMF. This type of scenario can possibly illustrate the growth effects of economic liberalization under 
the access to the institutional arrangements provided by the International Monetary Fund and other 
associated institutions. Using the latter set of countries as control group, the estimated counterfactual 
scenario can be estimated by leveraging the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces against the 
reference group having similar level of economic development, low level of economic liberalization up 
to the present day, and no access to the IMF in the years around the implementation of the Stabilization 
Plan, which can illustrate whether the latter posited an external shock for the economic growth at the 
subnational level. 
 
To capture the internal versus external effects of economic liberalization, we compare the growth 
trajectories of Spanish provinces with two blocks of the donor pool. The first block consists of 22 
countries16 which have maintained a low degree of economic liberalization until the present day but had 
access to the IMF before 1959. By matching the growth trajectories of provinces with this particular 
sample, we are able to parse out the “internal” effect of the Stabilization Plan. In contrast, the second 
block comprises 29 countries17 which also maintained a low degree of economic liberalization until the 
present day with no access to the IMF before 1959. Matching the respective growth trajectories allows 
us to determine whether the Stabilization Plan can be associated with an “external” growth effect. 
 
Figure 13 presents the estimated internal and external growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan for 
the selected provinces also reported in the baseline analysis. The evidence unequivocally suggests large-
scale “internal” growth gains emanating from the economic liberalization. In particular, the growth 
trajectories of Spanish provinces prior to 1959 tend to move in tandem with their synthetic control 
groups whilst producing a clear upward departure in the years after the Stabilization Plan. For all 
respective provinces, the gains are particularly large and indicate widespread improvements in the 
economic growth in response to the economic liberalization. These improvements appear to be both 
immediate and permanent, pointing out a reasonably strong structural break. Pointwise, the estimated 
per capita GDP gap in the last year of our post-treatment period ranges from +80% in Sevilla to +177% 
in Guipúzcoa. From a general perspective, the estimated gaps are closely related to the contrasts in the 
baseline effect and show that the Basque and Catalan provinces tend to have the largest growth effect 
whereas southern provinces have the lowest estimated per capita GDP gap. The resulting gaps indicate 
                                                          
16 Argentina, Bolivia, China, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Italy, Lebanon, Morocco, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Philippines, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Venezuela and Vietnam.  
17 Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ghana, 
Kosovo, M dagascar, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, 
Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Slovenia, Tunisia, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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large-scale growth gains plausibly emanating from economic liberalization in the context of having 
access to the international monetary system. The counterfactual scenario allows us to reasonably 
suggest that access to the international monetary institutions per se does not guarantee economic growth 
improvements in response to soft liberalization policies, whereas deep reforms such as the 1959 
Stabilization Plan can guarantee large-scale growth gains. Figure 14 reports the composition of 
synthetic control groups, suggesting that the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces are best 
reproduced by a combination of low-liberalization countries with IMF access such as Lebanon, 
Morocco, Dominican Republic, Argentina, Egypt, and Poland.  
By contrast, the external effect of economic liberalization does not seem to be immediate. Compared to 
the group of low-liberalization countries outside the IMF, the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces 
after the 1960s seem to follow the same trend with similar levels of per capita GDP as their respective 
synthetic control groups. The only exception is Valencia where we find evidence of improved growth 
in response to the Stabilization Plan. The growth trajectories of provinces using a donor pool of 
countries with no access to IMF and low level of economic liberalization can be best synthesized by the 
convex combination of growth characteristics of Slovenia, Ukraine, Montenegro and Cape Verde 
although in varying proportions across different provinces. This suggests that the growth effect of the 
Stabilization Plan is both endogenous to the growth process and does not seem to act as an external 
institutional shock but rather as an endogenous one.  
 
Figure 13: External and Internal Economic Growth Effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan 
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Figure 14: Composition of synthetic control groups in measuring the internal and external effect of 
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In this paper, we examine the contribution of economic and political liberalizations to subnational 
economic growth drawing on a sample of 50 Spanish provinces in the period 1950-2016. To this end, 
we exploit the 1959 Stabilization Plan and the democratization process of 1979 as key juncture points 
in the economic and political institutional transitions and estimate their respective impacts on the 
subnational economic growth rates. To isolate the effect of economic and political liberalizations, we 
compare the growth trajectories of Spanish provinces against the trajectories of countries without 
similar large-scale institutional transitions until the present day and use the synthetic control method to 
estimate the missing counterfactual scenarios. 
The results of our subnational analysis reveal an average growth effect of democratization on per capita 
GDP of about 10 percent. Leveraging the estimate against the existing scholarly literature, the estimated 
effect is not consistent with the notion of negative or null effect of democracy as claimed by some 
authors. However, the magnitude of our estimated effect of democratization is about one half of the size 
of the effect (estimated at the cross-country level) reported by Acemoglu et al. (2019), which implies 
that the long-term growth effect of democracy may be somewhat more modest compared to the existing 
literature. Since several factors can be held fixed at the subnational level, it is unlikely that the estimated 
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By contrast, we find a large growth effect of the economic liberalization. More specifically, our 
estimates suggest that the economic liberalization of 1959 based on technocratic economic policies is 
associated with 40 percent higher per capita GDP. On balance, this suggests that, in the case of Spanish 
provinces, the effect of economic liberalization appears to be four times greater than the effect of 
political liberalization, a result consistent with the prior cross-country findings by Giavazzi and 
Tabellini (2005). 
 
In spite of the presence of a marked heterogeneity in the size of the effect and although a positive effect 
can be perceived across all provinces, our evidence unveils broad-based and large growth gains 
associated with the 1959 Stabilization Plan, which appears to have been somewhat more favourable for 
the Basque and Catalan provinces, areas already richer than the rest of Spain prior to the implementation 
of the Stabilization Plan. The positive growth effect of the 1959 Stabilization Plan appears to be 
permanent and mimics the characteristics of the long-term structural break triggered by the liberal 
technocratic economic reforms and stabilization carried out in the autocratic political environment. By 
contrast, the positive growth effect of the democratization appears to be temporary. In the short term, 
democratization seems to have improved the growth trajectories of provinces above the plausible 
counterfactual characterization. However, up to the present day, the growth advantage stemming from 
democratization has fizzled out as the growth trajectories of a majority of provinces have retreated back 
to the counterfactual scenario. 
This article deepens the analysis of the effects of the 1959 plan to unveil which set of policies (included 
in the Plan) had a more important impact: those of an “internal” nature or those “external”, dependent 
on access to the IMF. Evidence suggests large-scale “internal” growth gains emanating from the 
economic liberalization. 
Several questions remain unresolved. Where do the subnational differences in the growth effects of 
liberalization come from? Do the local spill over or more general historical differences (Oto-Peralías 
and Romero-Ávila 2017) matter in the determination of the growth gains? These questions pose a 
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